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Abstract 
The purpose of the study was to examine the effectiveness of the Micro-Expressions Training 
Tool (METT) in identifying and using micro-expressions to improve lie detection. Participants (n 
= 90) were randomly assigned to receive training in micro-expressions recognition, a bogus 
control training, or no training. All participants made veracity judgments of five randomly 
selected videos of targets providing deceptive or truthful statements. Using Bayesian analyses, 
we found that the METT group did not outperform those in the bogus training and no training 
groups. Further, overall accuracy was slightly below chance. Implications of these results are 
discussed. 
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A test of the Micro-Expressions Training Tool (METT): Does it improve lie detection? 
Research on lie detection accuracy has consistently found disappointing results: In a 
meta-analysis of over 200 studies, Bond and DePaulo (2006) found that people reach on average 
54% lie detection accuracy. In another meta-analysis on individual differences in lie detection 
ability, Bond and DePaulo (2008) found that the variance in accuracy rates does not 
exceed what would be expected by chance alone (i.e., 50%). Both meta-analyses included studies 
that tested experts, high and low stakes lies, interaction with the liar, and exposure to liars’ 
baseline behavior. None of these factors had an effect on accuracy. Given that guessing alone 
produces a 50% accuracy rate, the stable finding of 54% accuracy, combined with little deviation 
between studies, indicates that human lie detection accuracy is poor (for an examination of the 
causes of this, see Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Thus, in the current study we sought to answer the 
important question that is: Is it possible to improve lie detection accuracy with training?  
Lie Detection Training 
Many different procedures to train deception detection exist; several have been 
empirically investigated, displaying much variability in their effectiveness (Driskell, 2012; Frank 
& Feeley, 2003; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). In some cases, training produced substantial 
improvement (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Porter, Woodworth, & Birt, 
2000) while in others it produced minimal or no increase in accuracy (Köhnken, 1987; Landry & 
Brigham, 1992; Vrij, 1994). Further, in several studies, training actually reduced accuracy 
(Kassin & Fong, 1999; Levine, Feeley, McCornack, Huges, & Harms, 2005). A meta-analysis of 
16 training studies found that those that included information regarding reliable cues to 
deception were most effective (Driskell, 2012)—although research has generally failed to find 
many reliable cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  
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Interestingly, research shows that training may have an effect independent of the quality 
of its content. Levine and his colleagues (2005) argued that rather than imparting knowledge 
relevant to deception detection, training partly affects performance by increasing judges’ focus 
and their critical consideration of the statements. To test this idea, Levine and his colleagues 
trained participants using valid and bogus training protocols. In line with their argument, they 
found that bogus and valid training had similar effects on performance. Other research has 
shown that training increases people’s confidence in their judgments as well as the tendency to 
judge statements as deceptive, when they are otherwise prone to be biased towards seeing the 
truth (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; Meissner & Kassin, 
2002). In sum, deception detection training has had a tenuous relationship with improving 
ability, with a training’s effectiveness being influenced not only by the accuracy of its content, 
but also by the biases and over-confidence it can create in trainees. 
Micro-Expressions Training Tool. This study investigates the efficacy of one specific 
lie detection training program: the Micro-Expressions Training Tool (METT; Ekman, 2006; Paul 
Ekman Group, 2011). The METT is a self-directed form of training intended to help improve the 
detection of the micro-expressions sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, contempt, and 
happiness. Micro-expressions are fleeting facial expressions of felt emotion, which have been 
reported to last only 1/25 to 1/2 of a second (Ekman, 1985; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011; Porter, 
ten Brinke, & Wallace, 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). The theory behind micro-expressions 
posits that when people attempt to mask their true emotional state, expressions consistent with 
their actual state will appear briefly on their face—thus, while people are generally good at 
hiding their emotions, some facial muscles are more difficult to control than others that is, and 
automatic displays of emotion will produce briefly detectable emotional “leakage”, or micro-
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expressions (Ekman, 1985). When a person does not wish to display his or her true feelings s/he 
will quickly suppress these expressions. Yet there will be an extremely short time between the 
automatic display of the emotion and the conscious attempt to conceal it, resulting in the micro-
expression(s) that can betray a true feeling, and according to theory, aid in detecting deception.   
The METT has received some support as a potential tool for improving recognition of 
overt emotional facial cues. Russell, Chu, and Phillips (1996) found that participants with 
schizophrenia performed better on an emotional recognition task after receiving the METT, 
performing to the same degree as control participants not diagnosed with schizophrenia. Marsh et 
al. (2010) studied longer effects of METT training, and found that emotional recognition was 
improved a month after training in participants diagnosed with schizophrenia. Matsumoto and 
Hwang (2011) examined micro-expression training in retail employees. They found that those in 
the METT group scored better in a test of recognizing micro-expressions and were rated as 
higher on measures of communicative skill in the work place both immediately after training and 
two weeks later. In sum, it appears that the METT is able to increase the recognition of overt 
emotions that people exhibit.  
Recognizing micro-expressions may have some utility as an aid for better recognizing 
facial expressions, but it is more prominently promoted as a potential tool to aid in detecting 
deception. The METT Advanced program, marketed by the Paul Ekman Group (2011), coined an 
“online training to increase emotional awareness and detect deception” and promoted with 
claims that it “…enables you to better spot lies,” and “is meant for those whose work requires 
them to evaluate truthfulness and detect deception—such as police and security personnel” (Paul 
Ekman Group, METT Advanced-Online only, para. 2). The idea that micro-expression 
recognition improves lie detection has also been put forth in the scientific literature (Ekman, 
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2009; Ekman & Matsumoto, 2011; Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018) and promoted in the 
wider culture. One example of this is its use as a focal plot device in the crime drama television 
series Lie to Me, which ran for three seasons (Baum, 2009). Though a fictional show, Lie to Me 
was promoted as being based on the research of Ekman. Ekman himself had a blog for the show 
in which he discussed the science of each episode (Ekman, 2010). Micro-expression recognition 
training is not only marketed for deception detection, but, more problematically, is actually used 
for this purpose by the United States government. Training in recognizing micro-expressions is 
part of the behavioral screening program, known as Screening Passengers by Observation 
Technique (SPOT) used in airport security (Smith, 2011; Higgenbotham, 2013; Weinberger, 
2010). The SPOT program deploys so-called behavior detection officers (BDOs) who receive 
various training in detecting deception from nonverbal behavior, including training using the 
METT (the specific content of this program is classified, Higgenbotham, 2013). Evidently, 
preventing terrorists from entering the country’s borders and airports is an important mission. 
However, to our knowledge, there is no research on the effectiveness of METT in improving lie 
detection accuracy or security screening efficacy. Given the resources devoted to the SPOT 
program, evaluating its core component is critical (United States Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2010). 
Micro-Expression Training and Lie Detection Accuracy 
The research on micro-expressions as a means to detect deception and honesty does not 
paint an optimistic picture for the utility of METT. Porter and ten Brinke (2008) asked 
participants to exhibit deceptive or truthful facial expressions in response to emotionally 
arousing videos. Inconsistent emotional displays did occur in about 50% of the sample, but 22% 
exhibited partial micro-expressions. These micro-expressions were equally likely to occur in 
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both feigned and genuine emotional expressions. In a similar study, Porter et al. (2012) also 
found that true micro-expressions occurred infrequently and were present in both deceptive and 
honest expressions. They also examined facial expressions in response to high and low 
emotionally arousing content and found that micro-expressions occur at similar rates in each. 
These findings were confirmed in an analysis of the facial expressions of high stakes liars and 
truth tellers (ten Brinke and Porter, 2012). 
The presence of micro-expressions also seems to be unrelated to lie detection accuracy. 
Ekman and O’Sullivan (1991; see also Ekman & Friesen, 1969) found that micro-expression 
recognition did modestly correlate with lie detection accuracy in a sample of Secret Service 
agents. Although it is worth noting that the Ekman and O’Sullivan (1991) study has since come 
under criticism for its selective reporting of the methodology (Bond, 2008). Porter et al. (2012) 
and Porter and ten Brinke (2008) found untrained observers’ ability to detect deception was only 
marginally better than chance, and was not improved with the presence of micro-expressions in 
the targets. Warren, Schertler, and Bull (2009) examined the relation between participants’ 
untrained ability to recognize micro-expressions and their ability to detect deception. One set of 
participants in this study reacted to emotional and neutral video clips. They both fabricated an 
emotional reaction and reacted genuinely to the videos. A second set of participants viewed these 
reactions and judged their veracity. After making these judgments, all participants then took the 
METT post-test in order to measure their accuracy in recognizing micro-expressions. The METT 
accuracy scores were not correlated with participants’ deception judgments. Of note, however, in 
none of these studies were participants in fact METT trained. 
The lack of research on deception detection using micro-expression training is 
problematic, given the widespread use of METT in practice, in particular in the airport security 
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screening SPOT program (Higginbotham, 2013; Weinberger, 2010). A report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that there is little empirical validation for the SPOT 
screening program and that at least 23 individuals attempting terrorist action have passed through 
screening points without garnering attention (GAO, 2010). Furthermore, this program costs over 
$200 million a year (GAO, 2010). Hence, it is critical to examine the efficacy of this component 
of security screening by empirically assessing the effect of METT training on lie detection 
accuracy. 
The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to test the effect of training in METT on lie detection 
accuracy. Some participants were randomly assigned to receive METT training; their 
performance on lie detection tasks was compared to those who received bogus “placebo” training 
or no training at all. We included a bogus control group in order to account for the effects of lie 
detection training unrelated to content (i.e., confidence and lie bias; Levine et al., 2005), as 
discussed above. We also tested METT on deception detection accuracy across different types of 
truthful and deceptive statements, which were collected from five different research studies. We 
included multiple types of statements in order to examine the effect of METT training over 
various types of lies (i.e., high stakes lies (Vrij & Mann, 2001), lies told by convicted felons 
experience interacting with law enforcement (Kassin et al., 2005; Toomey, 2013), and paradigms 
that more closely related to airport security screening issues (Street et al., 2011; Sorochinski et 
al., 2014). High stakes lies were included because some have argued that lie detection accuracy 
may be higher in situations in which the stakes are high rather than low (Buckley, 2012; Ekman, 
1993; O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley, & Tiwana, 2009). Indeed, someone suspected of an actual 
crime should experience more emotion and distress than someone who is participating in a 
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laboratory study. Further, laboratory studies also frequently use students as the targets, who 
likely do not have any experience lying in high stakes situations. Both of these stipulations could 
theoretically affect emotional facial displays both true and deceptive. Because the METT is a 
tool used in airport security screening training, we also wished to utilize statements that were 
more closely related to issues of airport and border security than the typical theft transgression 
paradigm (e.g. Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005). For instance, airport security 
officers will be concerned with preventing and apprehending those engaging in terrorist activity 
and work in border and customs security. We thus included a sample of veracity statements taken 
from a mock terrorism paradigm (Sorochinski et al., 2014) and a sample of statements made 
about travel to foreign countries (Street et al., 2011).   
Based on the meta-analyses of Bond and DePaulo (2006; 2008), we predict that none of 
the experimental groups will perform significantly better than chance and again, there will be 
support for the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). Based on previous research on micro-expressions, 
(Porter et al., 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Warren et al., 2009) 
we likewise predict that there will be evidence supporting the null hypothesis (and not the 
alternative) when comparing the METT training to bogus and no training conditions on lie 
detection accuracy (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we predict that training will affect confidence 
(Hypothesis 3) and lie-bias (Hypothesis 4), whereby participants in the METT and bogus training 
groups will exhibit higher confidence and a higher lie-bias compared to those who receive no 
training (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Masip et al., 2009; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
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Ninety-one students participated in the study. One participant was excluded for failing to 
follow instructions, yielding a total sample of 90. All participants were students in an 
introductory psychology course and received course credit for their time. Their mean age was 
20.2 (SD = 4.3); 71% were female; 29% were male. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the three conditions: METT training (n = 30), control training (n = 30), or no training (n = 30). 
Materials 
Stimulus videos. Each participant watched one video from each of the five sets of stimuli 
(five overall), resulting in 450 observations total. Videos were compiled from five different 
deception detection studies. All sets of videos contained truths and lies; however, videos were 
randomly selected for each participant resulting in each participant potentially viewing a 
different number of truths and lies (i.e., some participants saw all truths, some saw all lies, and 
some saw a combination of truths and lies). Participants were randomly assigned to view the five 
videos in one of five orders was predetermined by a Latin square. Further, given that certain sets 
contained more videos than others, we reduced the larger sets by randomly selecting videos from 
them resulting in a total of 172 videos (thus participants saw certain videos multiple times).  
Sorochinski et al. (2014). Videos from this study showed a mock interview of 
participants trying to convince an interviewer they were not involved in a mock terrorist activity. 
Suspects in this study had either participated in a mock terrorist activity (liars) or had run an 
innocuous errand (truth tellers). From this set we obtained 116 statements of which random 
selection yielded a subsample of 64 videos that we used. 
Toomey (2013). Videos from this study showed convicted felons during a mock 
interview during which they attempted convince the interviewer that they had not stolen a wallet. 
Participants had either stolen said wallet (liars) or performed a repetitive task (truth tellers). 
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From this set, we obtained 70 statements; random selection yielded a subsample of 53 videos 
which we used. 
Kassin, Meissner and Norwick (2005). Participants in this study were incarcerated felons 
who either provided a true or a false confession of their crimes to an interviewer. Participants 
either confessed to the true reason they were in prison (truth tellers) or were told to confess to a 
crime they had not committed (liars). From this set we obtained 10 statements, all of which were 
used in the current study. 
Street et al. (2011). The fourth set of videos showed participants who each made two 
statements describing different countries, one of which they had actually visited (truth) and one 
which they had never visited (lie). We used all 37 statements obtained from this set.  
  Vrij and Mann (2001). The fifth set of videos was compiled from press conferences in 
which individuals made statements asking the public to help find a missing relative or the killer 
of a relative. For some of these individuals, evidence found after the press conference indicated 
that they were involved in the disappearance and murder of the person (liars). For others, no such 
evidence was found and thus they were considered to be telling the truth in their press conference 
(for a more detailed description of the establishment of ground truth, see Vrij & Mann, 2001). 
We used all eight statements obtained from this set.  
METT module. The METT-trained group took the advanced training module on 
Ekman’s website, “METT Advanced” (Paul Ekman Group, 2011). The METT training consists 
of five parts: (1) pre-test, (2) training, (3) practice, (4) review, and (5) post-test. 
Pre-test. The pre-test presented trainees with 14 human faces (neck-up) in sequence. 
Each face was shown first with a neutral expression that then flashed an emotional expression 
lasting 70-100ms (micro-expression) then returned to the original neutral expression. The neutral 
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face remained on screen until trainees selected which emotion they believed they saw from a list: 
sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, contempt, or happiness. After classifying all 14 faces, 
participants were given a score representing how many of the micro-expression emotions were 
correctly classified. 
Training. During the training stage of the METT module, participants were given a list of 
eight videos, each demonstrating an emotion or combination of emotions: Anger, Disgust, Anger 
& Disgust I, Anger & Disgust II, Contempt, Happy, Sadness, and Fear & Surprise. Each video 
displayed a face or pair of faces transitioning between neutral and emotional expression in slow-
motion. This was repeated several times while a narrator pointed out specific aspects of the facial 
expression that were typical of the emotion being displayed. For example, in the Angry video, 
the narrator noted that, “the eyebrows are pulled down and together in both of these angry 
expressions”.  
Practice and review. After the training, participants practiced with 42 videos identical to 
the pre-test, supplemented with feedback after each selection of emotion displayed. The review 
consisted of eight videos similar to those in the training phase; the faces in the practice and 
review videos were different.   
Post-test. Finally, trainees took a 28-item post-test. The post-test procedure was identical 
to the pre-test except that different faces were used. Further, participants were informed that they 
should try to achieve a score of 80% as this was determined to be the cutoff for proficiency by 
the training module (Paul Ekman Group, 2011).  
Bogus training. We utilized a bogus control training group to account for the non-active 
effects of training (Levine et al., 2005), such as knowledge of being trained, fatigue effects from 
time spent to complete the training, and possible effects on motivation and effort. For this 
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purpose we used the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT; Costanzo & Archer, 1989) that has 
been used to train individuals to use verbal and nonverbal behavior to make social perception 
judgments about other people’s inner states and interpersonal relationships (Costanzo, 1992; 
Costanzo & Archer, 1989). The IPT consists of a 20-minute video in which 15 different scenes 
are presented. Each scene presents a brief social scenario, in which two or more people were 
conversing (e.g., an employee and employer talking). One question was posed for each scene, 
which typically asked the viewer to determine something about the relationship between the 
people (e.g., identify who in the aforementioned scenario was the employer). The information 
asked for in the question was not directly presented in the scene, but instead the viewer had to  
infer the information from the actors’ nonverbal behavior. After viewing each scene, the viewer 
was given a few seconds to answer the related question.  
The IPT does address some issues of deception, albeit somewhat briefly (i.e., three 
scenes) and the majority of the content addresses nonverbal behavior. We do not, however, 
believe it to be a genuine deception training protocol. It is not put forth as a lie detection training 
tool and we would not expect it to affect lie detection accuracy, as there is little support for using 
nonverbal cues to detect deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, the idea that nonverbal cues 
relate to deception is prevalent in the lay public (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996) and 
thus the IPT was well suited as a bogus lie detection training protocol, which is how it was 
presented to participants. 
Procedure 
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to receive the 
METT module, the bogus training (the IPT), or no training. Those in the METT and IPT 
conditions were first given instructions informing them that they would be trained in deception 
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detection. After completing the assigned training (or lack thereof), participants were shown a 
total of five videos of statements. They were asked to determine if the target in each video was 
lying or telling the truth and were instructed that for every correct decision they made, they 
would be entered into a lottery to win $100 –in fact they were all entered in the lottery.  Each 
video was preceded by a short description to provide some contextual information about that 
specific statement. After each video (five times each), participants completed the dependent 
measures described below. Once participants had viewed the five videos, they were debriefed, 
thanked, and dismissed.  
Dependent measures. After viewing each stimulus video, participants categorized the 
target as lying or telling the truth (a dichotomous decision that allowed us to calculate accuracy 
for each video). Participants then rated their confidence in their decision on a 10-point scale from 
1 (not at all confident) to 10 (extremely confident) and provided a continuous rating of veracity 
on a 10-point scale from 1 (definitely telling the truth) to 10 (definitely lying). Finally, 
participants were asked to provide an open-ended explanation for why they thought the target 
was lying or telling the truth.  
Coding of Reasoning for Veracity Decisions 
Two authors independently coded all participants’ self-reported reasons for their 
judgments. The reasons were counted and assigned to one of four a priori categories: Nonverbal-
body (NB), nonverbal-face (NF), verbal-content (VC), and verbal-paralingual (VP). For 
example, “She was moving her hands a lot” was coded as NB; “She kept looking around” was 
coded as NF; “He gave a lot of detail” was coded as VC; and “He didn’t stutter” was coded as 
VP. Inter-rater reliability between the four categories was adequate, with NB Krippendorff’s α = 
.69, NF Krippendorff’s α = .85, VC Krippendorff’s α = .78, and VP Krippendorff’s α = .69. 
MICRO-EXPRESSIONS TRAINING 15 
Raters’ scores were averaged and the means for the four reason categories was calculated across 
each participant’s judgments, and then divided by the length of the response, resulting in four 
reason-to-word ratios per participant. This was done in order to measure how much explanation 
and detail was given by participants for their reasons. 
Results 
METT Training  
Of the participants in the METT condition, 37.9% (n = 11) had pre-training 
scores above the target proficiency score of 80% correct. Post-training proficiency rates were 
twice as high, with 72.4% (n = 21) of participants above the 80 threshold. The average METT 
trainee’s improvement was significantly larger than zero—an increase of about 12% between 
pre- and post-training tests, t (28) = 4.11, p < .001, Mdiff = 11.66, 95% CI [5.85, 17.46], dz = 
0.76. 
Lie Detection Accuracy 
Overall, accuracy was slightly but significantly below the chance rate of 50%, (M = .46, 
95% CI [.42, .50]), t (89) = -1.98, p = .05, d = 0.21, not supporting our first hypothesis. As an 
exploratory analysis, we next considered whether lie detection accuracy was uniform among the 
five samples of statements. Across training conditions, lie detection was poor for statements 
from all five sets (see Table 1) and were not statistically better than chance. Participants 
performed significantly worse than chance when judging the statements of Vrij and Mann 
(2001), exact binomial p (two-tailed) = .031, and Kassin et al. (2005), exact binomial p (two-
tailed) = .045. Participants did not perform significantly different from chance when judging the 
statements of Street et al. (2011), exact binomial p (two-tailed) = .113, Sorochinski et al. (2014), 
exact binomial p (two-tailed) = .598, and Toomey (2013, exact binomial p (two-tailed) = .598. 
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We conducted a one-way ANOVA to compare accuracy across experimental conditions 
(METT vs. IPT vs. no training) to test for differences in lie detection accuracy between groups. 
This analysis revealed no significant difference, F (2, 87) = 0.22, p = .80, η2p = .01, with 
participants in METT training (M = .46, 95% CI [.38, .55]), IPT training (M = .47, 95% CI [.41, 
.53]), and no training (M = .44, 95% CI [.37, .50] all performing similarly.  
Because a non-significant null hypothesis test does not in fact provide support for the null 
hypothesis, we calculated Bayes factors to more strictly test our second hypothesis. We used the 
R package BayesFactor version 0.9.4 (Morey & Rouder, 2013) to calculate a Gunel and Dickey 
(1974; cited by Jamil et al., 2017) Bayes factor. A Cauchy prior was used with a scaling factor of 
r = 0.5. The Bayes factor is a ratio of the probability of the null hypothesis against the 
alternative. Assuming a joint multinomial sampling scheme, the data favored the null hypothesis 
of no difference between the three conditions by a factor of approximately 21 to 11. That is, we 
observed strong evidence in favor of there being no difference between conditions.  
To determine whether the METT group’s performance was attenuated by the nine 
participants who failed to reach competency on their post-training test we conducted two 
analyses, both of which led us to believe this was not the case. First, after excluding the nine 
participants who scored under 80, METT-trained participants’ performance increased slightly to 
just under the chance rate (M = .49, 95% CI [.40, .59]), but there remained no significant 
differences between conditions in lie-detection accuracy when submitted to the same one-way 
ANOVA as described above, F (2, 81) = 0.47, p = .63, η2p = .012. The Bayes factor also 
                                                     
1 A ratio of the probabilities of two hypotheses closer to 1 to 1 (or Bayes Factor of 1) indicates a 
lack of evidence, while those that diverge from 1 to 1 indicate evidence in favor of one of the 
two hypotheses (alternative and null), here with increasing odds (or higher value Bayes Factors) 
indicating higher likelihood of the data occurring under the null hypothesis (for a more detailed 
explanation of Bayes Factors, see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014).  
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indicated a higher probability of the null versus the alternative hypothesis being true by a factor 
of 17 to 1. Second, lie-detection accuracy within the METT condition was not significantly 
correlated with the METT proficiency pre-test score, r (27) = .16, p = .41, 95% CI [-.14, .41] or 
the post-test final score, r (27) = .24, p = .21, 95% CI [-.21, .64]. A Bayes factor gave 
indeterminate results and could not differentiate whether the null of no correlation was more 
probable than the alternative hypothesis of there being a correlation, given the observed data 
(Bayes factors of 2.09 and 1.16, respectively; see Ly, Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2016). A 
METT performance change score was calculated, to reflect to what extent METT-condition 
participants improved on the METT proficiency test administered before and after training. Lie-
detection accuracy was not significantly correlated with this METT change score, r (27) = -.02, p 
= .91, 95% CI [-.28, .23]. A Bayes Factor of 4 favored the null hypothesis of no correlation.  
Across all five samples of statements, participants who received METT training did not 
perform differently from those who received bogus or no training (see Table 1). All three groups 
performed equally poorly when judging the real-world, high stakes statements of Vrij and Mann 
(2001), χ2 (2, N = 87) = 1.01, p = .610, c = .11. The groups did not significantly differ in their 
judgments of airport screening-related statements from Sorochinski et al. (2014), χ2(2, N = 90) = 
0.27, p = .875, c = .05, or Street et al. (2011), χ2(2, N = 90) = 0.64, p = .725, c = .08. All of the 
groups performed equally poorly judging statements made by participants with felony records 
from Toomey (2013), χ2 (2, N = 90) = 0.27, p = .875, c = .05, or from Kassin et al. (2005), χ2 (2, 
N = 90) = 2.90, p = .235, c = .18. 
Confidence in Judgment 
Participants were highly confident overall (M = 7.25 on the 10-point scale, 95% CI [7.00, 
7.51]). A 3 (training: METT, IPT, none) x 2 (statement veracity: truth or lie) mixed ANOVA 
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found no main effect of training, F (2, 84) = 0.82, p = .44, η2p = .019 –all groups were highly 
confident. Though no more accurate in their classifications, participants were significantly, but 
only slightly, more confident after evaluating a truthful statement (M = 7.35, 95% CI [6.87, 
7.83]) than after judging a deceptive one (M = 6.93, 95% CI [6.65, 7.40]), F (1, 84) = 4.93, p = 
.03, d = 0.23. The training by statement veracity interaction was not significant, F (2, 84) = 0.87, 
p = .42, η2p = .020. The confidence-accuracy relationship was explored through a linear 
regression, with moderators to determine if the confidence-accuracy relationship differed by 
experimental condition. The model included lie-detection accuracy as the outcome and the 
following predictor variables (see Table 1): decision confidence, experimental condition (dummy 
coded with the control as reference), and the condition by confidence interaction. The 
confidence-accuracy relationship in the control condition did not significantly differ from zero, β 
= -.039, t (84) = -1.24, p = .219, and the moderator terms indicated that this confidence-accuracy 
relationship did not significantly differ between the control and IPT, β = .058, t (84) = -1.40, p = 
.165 nor the control and METT, β = .007, t (84) = -.145, p = .885. 
Continuous Veracity Measure 
A 3 (training: METT, IPT, or none) x 2 (statement veracity: truth or lie) mixed 
ANOVA was performed to investigate the extent to which participants’ continuous judgments of 
statement truthfulness differed by condition and by the veracity of the statement. Higher means 
indicated more perceived deception. There was no significant omnibus main effect of training, F 
(2, 84) = 2.78, p = .07, η2p = .062. A Bayes factor was calculated to compare two logistic mixed 
effects models. The alternative model replicated the preceding ANOVA, while the null model 
removed the main effect of training. A scaling factor of r = 1.0 was used to fit the Cauchy prior 
to the nuisance variables of participant number and video number. The Bayes factor favored the 
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null hypothesis of no effect of training by a factor of 4.  
We next compared METT and IPT trained participants’ judgment biases to those 
displayed by untrained participants. Lie bias was similar in the three conditions as well, F (2, 87) 
= 0.58, p = .56, η2p = .013, with no significant differences found in the number of lie judgments 
between METT (M = 2.47, 95% CI [2.07, 2.87]), IPT (M = 2.20, 95% CI [1.77, 2.63]), and no 
training (M = 2.20, 95% CI [1.79, 2.61]). A Bayes factor on the contingency table shifted the 
relative plausibility of the null compared to the alternative by a factor of 14.  
Reasoning for Veracity Decisions 
As an exploratory analysis, we examined participants reasoning for their decisions. We 
conducted a 3 (training: METT, IPT, none) x 4 (reason: NB, NF, VC, VP) mixed ANOVA, with 
the reason-to-word ratio as the dependent variable. Sphericity was violated (Mauchly’s W = .846, 
p = .15), thus Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to the F ratios are reported below. There was no 
significant main effect of the training, F (2, 86) = 1.79, p = .174, η2p = .040, as all three groups 
reported similar reason-to-word ratios overall. There was no significant main effect of reasoning, 
F (2.7, 233.3) = 1.72, p = .168, η2p = .020 –each of the four reason categories were observed at 
similar rates overall. Although the training by reason interaction was also not significant, F (5.4, 
233.3) = 1.24, p = .289, η2p = .028, we performed a planned contrast of the differences between 
training conditions in the non-verbal facial category. Of the four reason categories, we expected 
METT participants to include a larger number of non-verbal facial reasons for their veracity 
judgments. The results support our hypothesis. Moderate effect sizes were observed indicating 
that the METT-trained group (M = 3.31, SD = 2.06) cited more facial reasons than IPT-trained 
participants (M = 2.37, SD = 2.07), p = .064, dz = 0.46, and untrained participants (M = 2.16, SD 
= 1.67), p = .025, dz = 0.61. 
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Discussion 
This study is the first known test of the METT as a lie detection tool and offers no 
empirical support for its effectiveness. This conclusion is based on two sources of evidence. 
First, METT-trained individuals performed worse than chance; guessing would have produced 
marginally better results. Second, METT-trained participants performed no better than untrained 
or bogus trained individuals, in fact, there was strong support for the null hypothesis. All groups 
were very highly and equally confident in their ability to detect deception, even though their 
performance was poor overall. Prior research has demonstrated that training can lead to a lie 
bias, or a propensity to judge veracity statements as lies more frequently (Blair, 2006; Masip et 
al., 2009; Meissner & Kassin, 2004). We did not find support for this response bias in 
dichotomous judgments of truth and deception. We did, however, find evidence for it when 
participants were asked to rate their impressions of truthfulness on a continuous measure. This 
may be due to the fact that the impression ratings allowed for more range, and thus were more 
sensitive to capturing the effect than the dichotomous judgments. Further, when asked to rate the 
statements’ truthfulness, the METT group rated statements as less truthful overall than the 
untrained control group—with a moderate effect size (.40). So, while their training failed to 
improve their lie-detection abilities, it did make them more inclined to think people were lying. 
In anticipation of the possibility that the effectiveness of METT is task-specific, we also 
examined the effect of training across five different types of veracity statements. Our sets of 
videos provided for a range of stimuli in terms of content (i.e., relevant to security screening, 
missing persons, past transgressions), speakers (i.e., college students, prison inmates, people with 
a criminal record), and stakes (i.e., laboratory and field settings, real-world conditions). Yet, the 
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METT was no more effective than bogus or no training when assessing different types of lies, 
with accuracy still no better than chance for judging each type of statement.  
Despite the claims made and popular conceptions, the failure of the METT to bolster lie-
detection performance is not unexpected. Prior research shows that to the extent that micro-
expressions even occur, they are rare and occur both in the presence of truth telling and lying 
(Porter et al., 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Thus, even if the METT is successful in 
improving the detection of emotions in micro-expressions (a proposition we did not test), there is 
no a priori reason to believe that these emotions are valid indicators of truthfulness or deception. 
Training people in explicitly recognizing micro-expressions (via the METT) did not significantly 
improve lie detection accuracy (using Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing; NHST) and 
Bayesian analyses provided strong support for the lack of an effect, further supporting the 
proposition that micro-expressions are not linked to deception. The findings of this study are also 
in keeping with the vast majority of previous lie detection research, showing that people are little 
better than chance when making veracity judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Further, we build 
upon previous research with the use of Bayesian analyses providing the beneficial ability to test, 
and indeed find strong support for the lack of effectiveness of METT to detect deception, a 
proposition that cannot be supported using more standard NHST (for more detailed accounts of 
the limitations of NHST, see Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, 
Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011).  
Limitations 
There are some limitations to our study. Our study involved judgments made by college 
students from videos played in a laboratory setting. However, prior research has shown that 
observers with access to a live target do not perform significantly better (Hartwig, Granhag, 
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Strömwall, & Vrij, 2004); nor do police and other professionals perform significantly better than 
students (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Vrij, Akehurst, Brown, & Mann, 
2006). Further, even if these factors limit the effectiveness of the METT, we should still expect 
improvement over no training or bogus training. Of the participants in our METT training group 
30% did not meet the 80% proficiency score while nearly 38% of them met it on the pre-test 
measure. Taken together, it would seem that the METT did not make meaningful changes in the 
participants and would thus explain our findings. However, there is some evidence that METT 
training did have an impact on how participants approached the task. For one, participants who 
received METT training were more likely to focus on facial cues relative to other groups. 
Second, METT trained participants exhibited an improved ability to recognize micro-expressions 
from the pre-test to the post-test. However, it could be argued that improvement observed in 
recognizing micro-expressions (as expressed by the pre-test to post- test score improvements) 
could be due to practice effects rather than an actual improvement in skill. We see these as 
limitations as a function of the METT’s design rather than our research paradigm, as our 
participants took the test in the same program directed manner that consumers who purchase the 
test would. In fact this further demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the design of the METT. When 
we removed those who did not meet proficiency from the analysis, accuracy did not improve for 
the METT group and accuracy was not correlated with proficiency score. So even those who 
tested as highly skilled in recognizing micro-expressions did not perform better than chance in 
detecting deception. 
Conclusions 
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The Paul Ekman Group website claims that the METT “enables you to better able to spot 
lies” (Paul Ekman Group, What are Micro Expressions?, para. 1) and “has been scientifically 
proven and field tested” (Paul Ekman Group, How to Get Started, para. 4). We are not aware of 
this scientific proof for lie detection efficacy, so we aimed to directly test the claim. Our findings 
do not support the use of METT as a lie detection tool. The METT did not improve accuracy any 
more than a bogus training protocol or even no training at all. The METT also did not improve 
accuracy beyond the level associated with guessing. This is problematic to say the least given 
that training in the recognition of micro-expressions comprises a large part of a screening system 
that has become ever more pervasive in our aviation security (Higginbotham, 2013; Weinberger, 
2010). 
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Table 1 
 
Lie detection percent accuracy by condition and video set 
 
Training 
Video set METT IPT No training Total 
Vrij & Mann (2001) 44.80 32.10 36.70 37.90 
Street et al. (2011) 53.50 63.30 60.00 58.90 
Sorochinski et al. (2014) 43.30 50.00 46.70 46.70 
Toomey (2013) 46.70 43.30 50.00 46.70 
Kassin et al. (2005) 43.30 46.70 26.70 38.90 
Total 46.30 47.30 44.00 45.90 
 
 
